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THE INTERNET AND THE PERSISTENCE
OF LAW
JUSTIN HUGHES *
Abstract: Since legal commentators first confronted cyberspace, three
broad stories have emerged to describe the interrelation of law and the
Internet: the "no-law Internet,' the "Internet as a separate jurisdiction,"
and Internet law as "translation" of familiar legal concepts. This Article
reviews these stories, focusing on how ongoing "translation" is giving
way to a growing convergence in Internet law. The Article makes the
case for convergence among legal responses to cyberspace and proposes
a basic taxonomy for different models of convergence. With this
taxonomy, the Article examines the ways in which convergence is
occurring, as well as its effects on both Internet law and traditional.
national legal norms. The Article concludes that the common legal
norms being forged will affect national legal systems more deeply than
traditional "international" or "transnational" law, and that the
conversation on this affect has only just begun.
INTRODUCTION
Whether the advent of radio or the rise (or fall) of the Soviet'Un-
ion, any momentous social development tends to trigger a wave of
enthusiastic observations about the way the new world will he. The
Internet was no exception. First generation commentary about the
Internet was often so extreme as to make one thankful to be among
second generation commentators. That includes much of the initial
analysis, predictions, and prescriptions on how law and cyberspace
would interact, In scholarly pursuits as in military maneuvers, those in
the vanguard bear both the pleasure of arriving first and the danger
of becoming cannon fodder.
* Justin Hughes is Assistant Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law. Yeshiva Univer-
sity, and the 2003 Hosier Distinguished Visiting Chair in Intellectual Property at DePatil
College of Law, Chicago. My thanks to Kenneth Roost and Stuart Reimer for research assis-
tance for this manuscript; my thanks to Andrew McLaughlin, Fred Yen, and all the partici-
pants of the Boston College Law School Conference on Intellectual Property. E-
Commerce, and the Internet for helpful comments and a lively conversation on this Arti-
cle. The remaining errors are the exclusive intellectual property of the author.
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In the short lifetime of cyberspace, at least three broad kinds of
stories have already been told about how the Internet and law will in-
teract. These three distinct meta-visions of the relationship between
the Internet and law are discussed in Part I: the "no-law Internet," the
"Internet as a separate jurisdiction," and Internet law as "translation."
In the "no-law Internet" story, cyberspace is fundamentally inhospita-
ble to traditional law as a mechanism of control. Laws that serve en-
trenched interests simply will not stick to cyberspace—whether it is
censorship by the Singaporean government or copyright enforcement
by Bertelsman. In the second story, what I will call the "Internet as a
separate jurisdiction," cyberspace is both amenable to and in need of
some kind of laws. But the same technological characteristics that
make cyberspace resistant to traditional laws of traditional sovereigns,
lead to another conclusion: cyberspace should be its own jurisdiction.
The third story is less vision and more a practical program of
"translation": finding legal tools to reach roughly the same balance of
interests in the Internet that we have developed for the rest of our
world. Perhaps one can think of the Internet. as an Atlantis-like conti-
nent that has risen from the sea, been promptly populated, and now
needs sufficient order to ensure that the inhabitants do not hurt one
another (or the people on other continents) too much. The new re-
gion is now undergoing a program of "colonization"—lawyers, legisla-
tors, and lobbyists have moved quickly to extend familiar laws and re-
gimes into the new territory.
The pace of this colonization has been staggering: the Commu-
nications Decency Act (CDA), Child Online Protection Act (COPA),
Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act (DMCA), Uniform Electronic Transaction Act (UETA), Anti-
Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), E-Sign, and Uni-
form Computer Information Transaction Act (UCITA) are only the
American acronymic peaks of a vast international range of legislative
proposals and enactments. In California, the state legislature saw 258
Internet-related bills introduced in its 1999-2000 session, up from four
bills in 1994.
Because the initial wave of immigrants to cyberspace was over-
whelmingly American (both natural and juridical persons), American
courts were usually the first to address novel legal issues about the
Internet (although parallel fact patterns have quickly appeared in
other countries). Thus, when American academics began paying at-
tention to the Internet, it felt—despite the "global" rhetoric—like a
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wholeheartedly American institution) The initial wave of legal schol-
ars drawn to the Internet were, on the whole, experts in American
constitutional, criminal, commercial, and copyright law. Scholars es-
tablished in international or comparative law were a relative minority
of the new cyberlaw gurus.
Even today, novel cyberlaw problems statistically arise first in ei-
ther the United States or another common-law jurisdiction. Survey
information for 2002 puts Americans at 42.65% of Internet traffic,
dwarfing number two China (6.63%) and number three Japan
(5.24%).2 Adding Britain, Canada, and the United States, a bare ma-
jority of Internet traffic still collies from common-law, English-
oriented countries (50.52%).3 If American legal scholars have been
too "Americentric" about the Internet (and there have been excep-
tions), this is a good explanation for the myopia.
After the cyber-stock meltdown of 2000, it became the fashion of
well-paid consultants to tell business people that "we're still in the
early innings" of the Internet 4—advice as true for the law. By one es-
timate, Americans will comprise only one quarter of all Internet users
as early as 2005. 5 While the United States will remain the single larg-
est, monolingual, legally integrated economy on the Net, Americans
are now, for day-to-day purposes, like the largest shareholder in a vast.
corporation in which no one has majority control.°
This reality of the Internet means that the pragmatic project of
translation is forcing express and implicit consideration of how na-
tional legal systems resolve the same or similar problems differently.
One way or another, these differences have to be overcome—or not
allowed to arise in the first place. The result is that the Internet is
This also causes, in some countries, the perception that the Internet is yet another
American intrusion into local or national societies. See, e.g.. ANnEI: LUCAS, Wort.
n'Au'isus Numfituguy 7 (1998) (noting the "little polemical debate' in France over
whether the Internet is a "vehicle for American thinking").
2 China Second to US in Web Traffic: Study, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Aug. 1, 2002,
available at Intp:/ /www..sinh.com.au/articles/ 2002/ 08/01/1028157806643.html •
3 A reader may quibble that much Canadian traffic is Quebecois and, therefore,
French and civil law oriented. But this bare English majority does not include Australia,
New Zealand, Singapore. Ireland, Kenya, Nigeria, India. or South Africa (the last four
being common-law countries with English being the vastly dominant language of Internet
users).
4 Amy Harmon, An Internet Guru's Lexicon, NA; TIMES, May 13, 2001, § 3, at 14.
5 Michael Pastore, Global Internet Population Moves Away from US (Jan, 11, 2001). at
http://cyberatlas.internet.com/big_picture/geographics/article/0„5911_558061,00.html.
6 See generally MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING '111E [tour (2002) (describing development
of ICANN and political control issues surrounding "the root" control space for domain
names, hence order on the Internet).
362	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 44:359
producing and will continue to produce a significant amount of con-
vergence of legal systems. Recently, in discussing intellectual property,
French commentators Michel Vivant and Agnes Maffre-Battge have
made similar observations. Noting that there is an inherent tension or
conflict between private entities that want to circulate themselves or
their goods widely through the Internet and the nation-states that still
rely on territoriality, Vivant and Maffre-Bauge conclude:
This gives an indispensable characteristic to the adoption of
rules that are convergent, if not common, whenever possi-
ble. In truth, this means of harmonization has, for a long
time, been relied upon by States. But the "Internet phe-
nomenon" seems to make alternative formulae emerge
which one will need to consider for a moment.?
Indeed, there are both different ways to think about this convergence
and different ways this convergence is occurring.
As to how to think of this convergence, one way recognizes the
emergence of new international or transnational legal norms to which
nation-states and domestic legal systems increasingly ad here. 8 Another
way to think about this convergence focuses on the way the project of
translation gradually returns us to a vision of the Internet as its own
separate jurisdiction. Quite a few commentators saw the parallel to lex
niercatoria, which transcended national commercial laws to create what.
we might now think of as a virtual jurisdiction among transnational
merchants.9 Part I also argues that some visions of the Internet as its
own jurisdiction have tended to see the Internet as more separate and
distinct from the rest of reality than it is. 10 Because the Internet. is
weaving itself increasingly into our daily, meatspace lives, the com-
parison to /ex merculoria is inadequate. Part I offers some ruminations
7 Michel Vivant et Agnes Maffre-Batige. Internet et la propriiti intellectuelle: k drott,
rinformation et les riseaux, LES NOTES DE CIFRI 59 (Institut francais des relations
internationals, Paris, June 2002); see also Lucas, supra note 1, at 13 (recognizing that a
comparative-law approach is necessary to the minimal harmonization of law needed on the
Internet).
8 Jeremy Bentham introduced the notion of 'international law" as a more rigorous
concept than law of nations." See JEREMY IIENTIIAM , AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCI-
PLES or MORALS AND LEGISLATION 296 ( J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) (1789).
Philip Jessup recommended replacing Bentham's phrase with a broader concept of "trans-
national law." Num> C. JESSUP, TRANSNAT1ONAL LAW 2 (1956).
(I See I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "cyberspace, " 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993,
1019-21 (1994) (drawing parallel to lex mereatoria); David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law
and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1389-90 (1996).
Sec infra notes 16-47 and accompanying text.
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on how we might think of this distinct jurisdiction which is not so sepa-
rate.
Whatever metaphors we employ, the convergence of legal norms
being produced or prompted by the Internet is remarkable and re-
markably fast-paced. Part II presents a simple attempt at a taxonomy
of the emergence of legal norms governing the Internet. This taxon-
omy is only a tentative proposal, an outline of a framework that may
help people understand the nature of emerging Internet law. Such a
framework, as presented here or as more thoroughly developed,
might also help activists understand how to contribute more effec-
tively to the formation of Internet-related legal principles.
The taxonomy set in Part II presents four types of convergence of
law. The first is the creation of multilateral treaty regimes to which
nations and domestic legal systems adhere. In this top-down convergence,
private lobbying focuses on the international organs that. produce the
treaty. Development. of the legal norms is, at. least in the final stages,
fairly transparent. The 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) copyright treaties are a successful example of top-down con-
vergence. The negotiations over a possible Hague Convention on ju-
risdiction offer another example of this kind of legal norm formation.
American legal scholars are arguably the most conscious of, and the
most. involved in, this kind of convergence.
The second type of convergence is model-based or soft law conver-
gence. Instead of a treaty regime, an international model emerges, and
domestic legal systems gradually adopt the standards, if not the literal
legal language, of the international model. Part II discusses both how
the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy for the ".com" top level do-
main has become the preeminent model for such convergence and
how model laws for electronic contracting put forth by the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) have
been less successful.''
Part II then turns to a third kind of convergence: emergence of
legal norms without the intervention of diplomats and bureaucrats
working internationally." In this invisible hand or pa rail el ism conver-
gence, market forces produce a limited range of options for each
economy; countries must either adopt laws within this range or forego
the economic potential of the Internet. Part II discusses Internet serv-
II Sire infra notes 56-75 and accompanying text.
I2 See infra notes 75-110 and accompanying text.
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ice provider (ISP) liability and baseline rules on electronic contract-
ing as examples of invisible hand or parallelism convergence.
Part II also takes up a fourth area of convergence, one that is not
really convergence at alt.'s The most obvious area of law where the
Internet is unlikely to produce substantial harmonization of legal
norms in the medium term is freedom of expression. For example,
Canada and many European countries permit speech restrictions that.
are antithetical to Americans; China and Saudi Arabia impose restric-
tions that would be wholly unacceptable to Europeans.
One can find characteristics of each model in almost any area
where the Internet is bringing pressure for development of new law.
And there are many areas of law that may yet gravitate toward one
model of convergence over another. A few of these are briefly dis-
cussed in Part III. 14
 Indeed, the details of reality will spill over the
edges of any taxonomy. As noted earlier, this Article is a first sugges-
tion for a taxonomy of the development of Internet law. It is intended
to further, not fulfill, a conversation about this topic. As Robert
Nozick reminded its at the beginning of his own intellectual journeys,
"There is room for words on subjects other than last words."'5
I. COMPETING VISIONS OF THE INTERNET'S LAW
AND THE CASE FOR CONVERGENCE
At a meta-level, there have been at least three distinct visions of
the relationship between the Internet and law: the "no-law," "separate
jurisdiction," and "translation" visions of Internet law. Perhaps only
the first two deserve to be called visions. The third is more an on-
going "project"—a practical mission taken up in piecemeal fashion by
practitioners and policy makers. Cyberlaw has turned out to be a pro-
ject of "cyberizing" law, translating familiar legal concepts and the
rough balance of interests created by the legal system into the Inter-
net environment. Ultimately, this project of translation is returning us
to seeing the Internet as a special jurisdiction. But not as a hermeti-
cally sealed jurisdiction; the Internet is a jurisdiction whose legal
norms will increasingly overshadow divergent national legal norms. If
anything, this raises the stakes for each nation-state in the develop-
ment of the Internet legal norms.
n See infra notes 111-117 and accompanying text.
1-1
 See infra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
16
 ROBERT NOZ1CK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA, at xii (1974).
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A. The "No-Law" In fern et
The first vision of the Internet and law was simple: never the
twain shall meet. The Internet was the "brave new world" in which law
would be both unneeded and unworkable. Visions of a no-law Inter-
net came in different flavors—conservative, leftist, utopian, anarchi-
cal—but they were all founded on a determinism in which technology
became, as Reg Whitacker noted, "the autonomous engine of his-
tory."I
This determinism was built on a surprisingly fixed understanding
of the Internet's technology, an understanding that one can appreci-
ate in the context of the moment. Early cyberphilia treated the Inter-
net. as the end of History: claims like Iciyberspace is Platonism as a
working product"" and "[Ole Net wires the world for Hegelian
Geist" came from the mouths of early prognosticators. As Julian Stal-
labrass has noted, "the Hegelianism of the cyberphiles" was not a dia-
lectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, but "[rather], it is a fixed
state in which the end of history and the total realization of mind is
filially achieved."" Some legal connnentators were understandably
drawn in to this heady, but static vision.
The ingredients of the vision started with the Internet's basic dis-
tribution characteristics—almost frictionless, almost instantaneous,
very decentralized, and with information flowing from and through
different nodes—which made geography seem irrelevant. 20 Minimal
relevance of geography for distribution purposes was combined with
at least two other basic ingredients of the \'2K Internet. One ingredi-
ent was the amount of information in relation to humans and their
institutions. As Johnson and Post wrote, "The volume of electronic
communications crossing territorial boundaries is just too great in
relation to the resources available to [the government authorities to
18 REG ‘VIIEEACKER, THE END OF PRIVACY: HOW 1O AL SURVEILLANCE IS BECOMING A
REALITY 47 (1999).
17 Michael Heim, The Erotic Ontology of Cyberspace. in CYBERSPACE: FIRST STEPS 59, 64
(Michael Betted ikt ed.. 1991),
18 MARK C. TAYLOR & ESA SAARINEN, IMAGOLOGIES: NIEDIA PHILOSOPHY 3 (1994)
("Simcidt").
19 Julian Stallabrass, Empowoing Technology: The Exploration of Cyberspace, 211 New LEFT
Rev. 3, 9 (1995).
A.s judge Nancy Gentler characterized the Internet in 1997, "M he Internet has no
territorial boundaries. To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, as far as the Internet is concerned,
not only is there perhaps 'no there there,' the 'there' is eueiywhor where there is Internet
access." Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Stipp. 456, 462 (D. Mass. 1997).
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permit meaningful control]."21 Johnson and Post's conclusion de-
pended on a particular understanding of the technology that still
seems correct, but is and will be challenged. 22
Another basic characteristic was anonymity. Of course, this ano-
nymity seemed ubiquitous because of fairly primitive technology—
written words on a glowing screen instead of the human voice or
visage. E-mail from someone or something other than the purported
author became a device in the plots of Broadway shows, motion
pictures, and television programs. The anonymous characteristics of
the Internet will ebb and flow as anonymizer and identifier
technology "duke it out," with broadband and Web-cams lurking on
the edges of the Net's presently text-based world.
An Internet without law was an understandable first response to
this amazing non-geography of the Internet. In James Boyle's apt de-
scription of this view, It] he state is too big, too slow, and too geo-
graphically and technically limited to regulate a global citizenry's
fleeting interactions over [this] mercurial medium."23 If the rise of
modern law depended, as Henry Maine observed, on a definition of
political belonging based on "topographical limits," 24 then a cyber-
world without territory or topographical limits would be inhospitable
to both the enforcement mechanisms and the analytic tools of mod-
ern law. Examples of attempted enforcement mechanisms include any
number of attempts to censor the Internet with firewalls. An example
of the inability of analytic tools of modern law to adapt to the Internet
is Martin Redish's 1998 suggestion that the ubiquitous nature of the
Internet made the old jurisdictional tools irrelevant 25—a conclusion
21
 Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1372.
" For example, Packetshaper software promises real time analysis and discrimination
based on protocol, application, URL, etc. One can find a description of Packetshaper at
lutp://www.packeteencom/products/packetshaper/index.cfm. Developments in artificial
intelligence will further undermine the assumption that government eyes and ears cannot
be everywhere,
23 James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwirrd Censors, 66
U. Cm. L. REV. 177,183 (1997). Boyle's message in this excellent article is that the "info-
libertarians should not be so quick to write off the state," a prognosis that has proved am-
ply correct. Ed. at 184.
24 Sec SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 124-26 (Univ. of Ariz. Press 1986)
(1864).
25 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Of New Wine and Old Bottles: Personal finisdiction, the Inter-
net, and tlw Nature of Constitutional Evolution, 38 ilikt151Fruics J. 575.605-06 (1998) ("RI he
technological development of the Internet effectively renders the concept of purposeful
availment both conceptually incoherent and practically irrelevant. An individual or entity
may so easily and quickly reach the entire world with its message that it is simply not help-
ful to inquire whether, in taking such action, that individual or entity has consciously and
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that any number of courts, compelled by real cases and zero legislative
guidance, blissfully ignored.
One can still find evidence to support the notion that the Inter-
net is inhospitable to the mechanisms of modern law. For example,
Australia has a law by which the Aitstralian Broadcast Authority (ABA)
receives complaints about materials on the Web, reviews those materi-
als pursuant to pornography/obscenity standards applied to broad-
casts, and sends "take-down" orders when it deems inappropriate cer-
tain materials hosted on Australian sites. 26
There is much about the Australian law that appears wrong-
headed—starting with the application of broadcast, not print, stan-
dards for pornography to the Internet. Looking beyond those sub-
stantive questions, however, the law serves as a wonderful example of
a sovereign's inability to control the Internet effectively. During the
second six months of 2000, the ABA handled complaints directed at
prohibited materials on 139 sites. 27
 Of these 139 sites, Australia hosted
only six, all of which received take-down notices from the ABA. As to
the other 136 sites, the ABA forwarded information from the com-
plaints to software filtering companies28
 and to the Australian federal
police, but there is no evidence of any attempt to prosecute the for-
eign sites in Australia. The Australian experience comports with a re-
mark made in 2002 by a deputy minister in Iran's Ministry of Culture
and Islamic Guidance that. "control has no meaning on the Inter-
net.. "29
But the descriptive account on which the "no-law" Internet was
founded suffers from two shortcomings. The first was the naivete of its
technological determinism. One does not have to be against deter-
minism to be skeptical of human omniscience. If we know anything
about the flow of technology, it is that it goes back and forth, moves in
unexpected directions, and detours into niches and eddies that few
carefully made the decision either to affiliate with the forum state or seek to acquire its
benefits.").
26 Greg Taylor, Regulatory Failure: Australia's Internet Censorship Regime, Electronic Fron-
tiers Australia (May 5, 2001), at http://www.efa.org.att/Publish/aba_analysis.html.
27 Id.
28 Id. ("[T]he ABA is spending over 95% of its effort on complaints about overseas
sites that are then referred to filtering companies. This represents a government subsidy to
a largely US-based industry that is probably already well ahead of the government any-
way. ")
Nazila Fathi, Taboo Sulfing: aide Here for Iran ... , N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, § 4, at 5.
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would have anticipated. Centuries of military technologym and our
recent experience with communication technologies offer examples
of the unanticipated flow of technology. 31 The image of a "continuing
race of offensive and defensive technologies" on the Internet" is
metaphorical to some and very real to others, but, in either case, it is
a race in which no one should expect a final "winner."
The second shortcoming was a more basic and fundamental in-
completeness in the non-law Internet narrative. This was a certain
myopia about the nature of the Internet's connection to meatspace.
The culture of computer scientists is not one with much familiarity
with the instruments of state power. Whatever their geekishness, early
Netizens were people who paid their taxes, did not commit felonies in
physical space, and often lived deep within institutions (universities,
corporations, foundations) where other people took care of compliance
with law. The early idealism overlooked the fact that while the mate-
rial of the Internet could move from server to server across borders to
evade the law, the people who controlled the servers—or who were
identifiably responsible for the content—could not. Usually those people
have mortgages, bank accounts, and dinner plans for Saturday night.
If efforts to go after offending Web sites will merely drive them or
their material off-shore, a very different situation applies to ISPs, tele-
coms, and cybercafes. A state's effective enforcement mechanism does
not have to touch all actors as long as it touches actors who can im-
pact everyone else's behavior. The obvious strategy; as James Boyle
noted years ago, was to "seek out private actors involved in providing
Internet services who are not quite as mobile as the flitting and fre-
quently anonymous inhabitants of cyberspace."" China, known for its
"great firewall of China" approach to censorship, is increasingly turn-
ing toward control of ISPs and cybercafes. 34 In 2002, China began
" See generally WILLIAM M. MCBRIDE, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND "IllE UNITED
STATES NAVY, 1865-1945 (2000).
31 When broadcast television was introduced, one could easily , predict that the flow of
technology was against small cultures, sub-cultures, and minority points of view. Cable tele-
vision and rising disposable income undid these dire, technology-based predictions. The
market for audiovisual works continues to fragment and differentiate as it becomes possi-
ble to deliver more and more channels into each home. In 1965, technology practically
rendered publishing in some less common languages (Dutch, Danish, Swahili, Bambara,
etc.)•an economic dead-end, but the advent of desktop publishing technology undid sonic
or all of those economic disadvantages.
32 Erik ECkhOiM, ... And Click Here for China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,2002, § 4. at 5.
"Boyle, supra note 23, at 197.
34 Sec BBC News, China Internet Firms -Self-Censoring" duly 5, 2002), available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/2098530.stm.
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promoting "self-discipline pacts" with ISPs by which the ISPs agree to
ban not just illegal content, but content "harmful to national security
and social stability.""
While it is certainly more efficient to go after larger infrastruc-
ture entities, a sovereign also has the ability to do nasty things to indi-
vidual cybernauts whose corporeal bodies remain on the sovereign's
side of the computer screen. For example, in 1997, Germany prose-
cuted the head of CompuServ's German subsidiary on pornography
charges stemming from Internet traffic." More recently, the 2002
Chinese crackdown on cybercafes has included the installation of
software that records attempts by cafe users to access banned sites. 37
Also that year, a forty-year-old former policeman, Li Dawei, became
the first individual Chinese citizen sentenced to prison for download-
ing materials deemed politically unacceptable."
B. The Kingdom of the Internet
If one travels down the path that traditional "law" cannot apply to
the Internet, one faces a fork in the road. Either one envisions the
Internet as an anarchical environment or one imagines the establish-
ment of order—including non-legal rules—through principles of self-
organization or consensus mechanisms or technology. As to technology,
a series of commentators from the mid-1990s onward—M. Ethan
Katsh, William Mitchell, Larry Lessig, and Joel Reidenberg39—re-
minded everyone that in cyberspace software code is law, or a form of
restraint as good or better than law. Some person did write the soft-
ware code, even if that person did not write it with Tibetan dissidents,
Napster, and billions of bizarre Web pages in mind. Nevertheless, the
code come[ be rewritten.
35 Id.
36 Dr. Gunnar Bender, Bavaria v. Felix Sown: The Pornography Conviction of the Former
CompuSery Manager: INT'e. J. COMM. L. Summer 1998, I 2, at http://wwwdigital-
law.net/IJCLP/1_1998/ijelp_webdoc_1 •1_1_1998.html; Edmund L. Andrews, CompuSery
Unit Chief Is Indicted in Germany, INT'L HERALD 1111B., Apr. 17, 1997, at 13.
37 F.ckholm, supra note 32.
38 China Jails Politically Incorrect Net User 11 Mars, MERCURY NEWS (San Jose), Aug. 5,
2002, at h ttp://www.sil iconvalley.com/mId/  s iliconvalley/news/ed ito ria1/3803541. tm.
38 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS or CYBERSPACE (1999); WIL-
LIAM MITCHELL, CITY or Bus (1995); NI. Ethan Katsch, Software Worlds and the First
Amendment: Virtual Dootheepers in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 335; Lawrence Lessig,
Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY Li. 869 (1996); Joel R. Reidenberg, Govern-
ing Nehoorks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911 (1990; Joel R. Reidenberg,
Lex Informatico: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 7611x. L.
553 (1998) thereinafter Reidenberg, Lex InformaticaJ.
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In terms of self-organization, consensus, and new forms of law,
David Johnson and David Post have been perhaps the two most elo-
quent conunentators for this vision of the Internet.40 In this view, self-
organization is seen as the mechanism by which a variety of communi-
ties will emerge with different governing contractual structures and by
which individuals will have the freedom to move among those emerg-
ing communities.'" Such a vision is very much akin to the self-ordered
libertarian world of varied communities put forward in Anarchy, State,
and Utopia.42
It is only a small step or series of steps from seeing the Internet as
needing non-legal rules to seeing the Internet as needing some sort
of legal rules, even if those rules were to be as radically different from
existing law as "socialist law" had been (or proclaimed itself to be) a
radical departure from established capitalist law. As Johnson and Post
reasoned in 1996, the virtual world was separate from the "real world"
and "[t] his new boundary defines a distinct Cyberspace that needs
and can create its own law and legal institutions."43 In other words,
this was a vision of the Internet as its own jurisdiction, a kind of king-
dom of cyberspace where we would have the chance to rethink law and
implement clearer and more rational rules. Although the concept of a
self-ordered Internet was popular for only a brief moment, one may
still hear its echoes when countries undertake organized, national ef-
forts to address the legal quandaries created by the Internet ."
40 Sec generally David G. Post & David. R. Johnson, Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent:
Toward a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 Cnt.-1(twr L. REV.
1055 (1998); David R. Johnson, Let's Let the Net Self-Regulate: The Case for Allowing Decentral-
ized, Emergent Self-Ordering to Solve the "Public Policy" Problems Created by the Internet, at
http://www.cli.org/selfordiessay.htm  (last visited May 9, 2003); David R. Johnson & David
G. Post, And How Shall the Net Be Governed?: A Meditation on the Relative Virtues of
Decentralized. Emergent Law (Sept. 5, 1996) (draft), available at hup://www.cli.
org/emdraft.html.
41 See, e.g., Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1398-1400 (noting that "exit options" from
virtual communities mean that different communities could flourish with people free to
move easily among them); John 0. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the
First Amendment, 63 U. Cm. L. REV. 49, 100-07 (1996). In his article. McGinnis noted that,
up until 1996, the Internet's "growth haldl been achieved with no guidance front the state
and little regulation outside the enforcement of private ordering through contract." Id. at
102.
42 Sec generally Nozu:K, supra note 15.
43 Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1367.
44 See, e.g., Lesley Stones, Delegates Disagree About Regulation of Laws, Bus. DAV ( Johan-
nesburg), Apr. 23, 2001 (describing South African national conference on e-commerce
laws where some advocated "a few tweaks and twiddles to existing laws" and others sought
"one new, all-embracing law covering every aspect of e-commerce"), available at http://all-
africa.com/stories/200104230184.html.
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In retrospect, this vision suffered from seeing cyberspace as too
separate from the "real world." In positing a consent-based, separate
legal regime for the Internet, Johnson and Post made the pithy point
that "[n]o one accidentally strays across the border into Cyber-
space."45 But is that as true today as it was five years ago? The Internet.
is being woven into the rest of reality—technologically, socially, and
economically. As our appliances become "smart," our houses become
"wired," our telephony is done with packet-switching, and our cable,
telephone, and Internet services bundle and unbundle, will we know
when we "crossed" the cyberspace border? Even if we did know,
should it matter? No one unknowingly strays into a phone call, but
that does not mean that the wires and ether of telephone conversa-
tions should he their own jurisdiction separate from the rest of our
lives. When General Motors completes a multi-million dollar deal with
IBM over the Net, will either party want different contract law to apply
to that transaction as distinct from the rest of their dealings? With
thousands of its residents ordering consumer goods over the Internet,
how long can a state ignore the lost tax revenue on the grounds that
its citizens crossed into another jurisdiction?
Instead of being a hermetically sealed world in which different
economic models could be developed for everything from copyright
to antitrust, 46 cyberspace was having significant real world effects:
children were getting access to pornography that they otherwise
could not get, political dissidents were able to get and give informa-
tion they otherwise could not get and give, people were selling, trad-
ing, and giving away things—often things they did not have or did not
have the authorization to sell or trade. It is not that the real world
dashed the idealism of the cybernauts without provocation; on the
contrary, the effects of cyberspace first spilled over into meatspace-
and reality bit back.
So, the utopian vision of a no-law Internet and the theoretical
vision of a kingdom of cyberspace gave way to a very practical project:
a project of translating real world laws, so that the balance they draw
in the real world would be roughly replicated in cyberspace. Certainly
some private entities have used the moment to try to shift the balance
in their favor—this is how many scholars understand the DMCA. But
the publicly justifiable principle is, at best, one of translation, i.e., that.
45 Johnson & Post, SIIP117 note 9, at 1379.
46 See id. at 1382-84 (discussing antitrust and copyright models).
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we should use existing instruments and preserve "balances" of inter-
ests whenever possible.
I say the publicly justifiable principle is at best one of translation
because governments do not always intervene to transfer the existing
balance of real world interests into cyberspace—a lesson that travel
agents have learned very well. One of the results of e-commerce is
that it produces "disintermediation" and "reintermediation," new
ways to express the creative destruction of a market economy. Travel
agents have found themselves increasingly disintermecliated as con-
sumers book hotel reservations and buy airline tickets online from
either the hotels or the airlines or from the new information aggrega-
tors, i.e. Travelocity.com
 and Orbitz.com. Traditional auction houses
have also suffered economically at the hands of eBay, and car dealers
have barely slowed the automobile manufacturers from selling directly
to the public. Why have these people gone unprotected from an
Internet-driven "re-balancing" while intellectual property owners have
been shielded in increasingly fortress-like statutes? The explanations
range from good economic theory to raw public choice theory.
C. Translation, Convergence, and the Internet as a Special Kind of
Jurisdiction, Not Just a Special Jurisdiction
If each country could colonize its own zone of the Internet, we
would have only the makings of interesting comparative law. But con-
tent on the presently configured Internet gives national boundaries
the same deference as do migratory birds, viruses, and carbon gas
emissions. Because of its similar migratory nature, regulating the con-
tent on the Internet requires Id °operation among all countries ...
[to] assist in the construction of a seamless environment for elec-
tronic commerce."47
 In other words, governments will have to accept
a zone of harmonized Internet law that, at a minimum, functions as
an autonomous region within their legal systems—just as the expecta-
tion of international merchants that lex mercatoria would govern their
transactions could only develop where national governments willingly
recognized lex mercatoria principles as governing such transactions.
But, the question remains as to how this area can still be distinct.
from the rest of a nation's law. The vision of a separate "contiguous"
cyberspace jurisdiction does not adequately acknowledge how the
Internet—e-commerce, e-communications, e-socialization—perme-
47 Joint Statement on Elec. Commerce, Jan. 30, 1999, U.S.-U.K., available at http://
www.iwar.org.tik/e-cosnmerce/resotircesittsukecommerce.htm.
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ates each national society. Instead, the hackneyed metaphor of the
information superhighway may help. The American interstate high-
way system penetrates and bisects fifty jurisdictions that retain their
own road and driving laws. The interstate system is woven into those
local road systems where local rules govern. Yet the interstate system
imposes a wide range of uniformity on the conduct of those who use
it. The interstate system is nearly seamless in that each interstate
highway has the same construction, same style of signs, same grades of
ramps for ingress and egress, and largely consistent speed limits. The
interstate system thus functions much like a separate jurisdiction that
is blended and completely integrated into each state's economic and
social life.
As the Internet penetrates each national society, we should ex-
pect that laws governing the Internet will increasingly influence laws
governing behavior off the Internet. For example, some people noted
that defamation law might be adjusted for the Internet environment
to reflect the fact that a person defamed on the Internet has more
opportunity/power to respond in kind. If that is true, as everyone be-
comes wired, the same justification should suffice to change all defa-
mation law because a person defamed off the Internet will be able to
use the Internet as a successful platform for response. Does it really
make sense, as the Internet permeates our lives, to have different on-
line and offline laws for contract, consumer protection, defamation,
or trademark infringement? Sometimes, perhaps, but not as a general
rule. If this is correct, the pressure to produce a set of convergent or
harmonized legal norms to govern behavior in the jurisdiction of the
Internet will result in pressure to produce new legal norms that will
wear away at older, differing legal norms in each national system.
II. A TAXONOMY OF INTERNET LAW FORMATION
There are at least four ways legal norms are converging (or not)
via the economic and social force of the Internet.
A. Top-Down. Convergence: Treaty-Based Development of Legal Norms
The first of these is "top-down" convergence in which a multilat-
eral treaty is negotiated and countries are pressured to ratify, then
implement, the new legal norms of the treaty regime. Perhaps the
best example to date of top-down convergence of Internet-related
laws has been the WIPO copyright treaties crafted in December 1996
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—the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances
and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) . 48
The mid-1990s certainly had elements that pointed toward a top-
down solution to the new phenomenon of the Internet. The interna-
tional bureaucratic community was flush with the successful negotia-
tion and conclusion of the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights) Agreement and the Marrakesh Agreements as a
whole. The TRIPS Agreement, however, created a problem for WIPO.
\1U° administered the traditional, dominant multilateral intellectual
property treaties (the Paris and Berne Conventions), but found that
TRIPS gave the World Trade Organization (WTO) jurisdiction over
the new generation of multilateral intellectual property obligations.
One sure way for WIPO to reinvigorate its role would be a round of
new, twenty-first century multilateral intellectual property obligations
which were not integrated into TRIPS.
While the WCT and WPPT "clarified" certain copyright issues
that had become more important in the digitized, networked envi-
ronment, the treaties were principally intended to augment interna-
tional copyright norms in three respects. The three basic additions to
international norms of copyright law were: (a) generalizing existing
rights of distribution, broadcast, and public performance into the
more generic rights to "make available to the public" or "communi-
cat[e] to the public"; (14 creating obligations about the protection of
"rights management information"; and (c) creating obligations vis-a-
vis "technological measures" that copyright owners use to control the
distribution and use of their works.
The generalized right to make available or communicate a work
to the public is intended to capture both how the Internet works and
how future technologies for disseminating content might work. 49 It is,
48 See WIPO Copyright Treaty, opened for signature Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65, WIPO
Publication No. 227(E) [hereinafter WCT], available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/
ip/wct; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, opened for signature Dec. 20, 1996. 36
1.L.M. 76, WIPO Publication No. 227(E) [hereinafter WPPTI, available at http://www.
wipo ,int/treaties/ip/wppt.
49 See WCT, supra note 48, arts. 6, 8, 36 I.L.M. at 69-70. Article 6 of the WCT is cap-
tioned "Right of Distribution" and establishes a general "exclusive right of authorizing the
making available to the public of the original and copies" of works; Article 8 of the WCT is
captioned "Right of Communication to the Public" and establishes that authors shall enjoy
an "exclusive or wireless means, including the making available to the public of their work
in such a way that menibers of the public may access these works from a place and at a
time individually chosen by them." This last phrase is intended to describe generally
Internet distribution and delivery, but the interconnection of the two Articles is clear in
that Article 8 equates a "making available to the public" Nia wire or wireless means as a
20031 .	 The Internet and the Persistence of Law 	 375
in a sense, an admission that despite the fact that past copyright law
responded to technological developments in a piecemeal fashion, fu-
ture copyright law should anticipate future developments by seeking
to establish a generalized characterization of the author's right to
control dissemination of a work.
Top-down convergence is not simply a matter of writing a treaty
and waiting for countries to implement it. The troika of new copy-
right norms were drafted in sufficient generality that implementation
of the norms quickly became an area of intense jockeying by inter-
ested parties. 54 Generalizing the author's right to control dissemina-
tion of the work was perhaps the easiest element of the two treaties to
implement because that norm was already expressed in most coun-
tries' copyright laws and/or can be re-expressed again and again with
each new technology. The implementation of rights management in-
formation and the WCT/WPPT protection of "technological meas-
ures" has been far more contentious.
The treaties require signatories to provide "effective legal reme-
dies against the circumvention of effective technological measures
that are used by authors" in the exercise of their copyright. rights. 51 In
other words, countries must provide legal remedies against "digital
lock picks" that can be used to disrupt or circumvent encryption,
scrabbling, watermarks, and passwords used by copyright owners to
protect their works. These new copyright legal norms have been the
subject of tremendous debate—even as to whether they are copyright
legal norms at all, 52
It became quickly clear to interested parties that domestic im-
plementation of new legal norms by the United States, the European
Union, and Japan would determine the actual content of interna-
tional legal norms. The provisions of the DMCA and the European
"communication to the public." See also WPPT, supra note 48, arts. 8, 10, 36 I.L.M. at 83
(showing that the \VPPT has provisions that parallel those in the WCT).
5(1 And properly so, not just for practical reasons, but because the content of interna-
tional legal norms can depend on their interpretation and implementation by nation-
states. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(3) (b), opened for signature May
23. 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (stating that when interpreting a treaty, account shall be taken
of "any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agree-
ments of the parties regarding its interpretation").
51 WCT, supra note 48, art. 11, 36 I.L.NI. at 71; WPPT, supra note 48, art. 18, 36 I.L.M. at
86.
52 See, e.g„ 3 MrLvit.t.t; 11. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NInktmEirt na CorvitiGH•
§ 12A.18[A] (2002).
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Union Copyright Directive" on "technological measures' are
sufficiently consistent that they de facto fill the "content" of these
WCT/WPPT legal norms,54 although a few countries, like Burkina
Faso and Australia, believe that they can meet the treaty obligations
with much less normative content.
In the world of policy and law, negotiations of multilateral treaty
obligations and their subsequent implementation are high profile af-
fairs, so much so that people sometimes see them as the sole means of
harmonizing law. For example, one commentator, looking at the
Internet in 1998 and citing the eight years needed to negotiate the
WTO Agreements, concluded that "harmonization of legal standards
is not a realistic solution to global information issues."" But there are
other ways to skin a cat or produce a legal norm.
B. Model-Based Emergence of Legal Norms
In addition to the "hard law" model of multilateral treaty making,
there is a "soft" form of top-down formation of Internet legal norms:
the development in an international forum of a model law or set of
principles which gain currency. An express, but not completely suc-
cessful attempt at this has been the 1996 UNCITRAL model law on
electronic commerce." A more subtle and successful example is the
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) for addressing "cyber-
squatting" disputes between domain name (or DN) registrants and
trademark (or TM) holders.
B 5 Compare Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1205 (2000) with
Council Directive 2001/29/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 167), available at http://wwweurorights.org/
eudinca/CopyrightDirective.html.
" Implementation of the •VCT/WPPT by the United States and the European Union
may have wandered beyond the four squares of the norms established by the treaties. For
example, Alain Strowel has noted that in implementing WCT Article 11, both the United
States and the European Union have established prohibitions on technological protection
measures that attack controls on access; however, if access is a tight of copyright holders, it
has usually been a right protected by real property law (control of access to cinemas and
concert halls, etc.) rather than copyright law. Alain Strowel, Droit d'auteur et acres
!'information: de quelques malentendues a vrais problimes a :rave's l'histotie et les developpements
ricents, 12 LES CAMERS DE PROPRIta INTELLECTUELLE 185, 206-08 (1999) ("11.]a partie la
plus unportante de cette reglementation concerne les measures touchant a raccis, mais,
en revancne, it regard de ces measures, auctme obligations n'existe en vertu des Traites tie
l'OMPI" and observing that this might cause a divergence in norms).
as Reidenberg, Lex Informatica, srtpro note 39, at 577.
55 Model Levi on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment, C.A. Res. 162, UNCITRAL,
51st Sess. (1996), available at http://wwwuncitral.org/english/texts/electcom/mlecomm .
htm [hereinafter UNCITRAL &Commerce Model Law].
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The problem of "cybersquatting" arises when A controls a do-
main name that is the same or substantially similar to a trademark
controlled by B. Typically, A registered and/or maintains control of
the DN with knowledge of its similarity to the trademark. If A simply
warehouses the DN, it denies B an obvious—sometimes the most ob-
vious—way to exploit his trademark on the Internet. Among other
arguments. defenders of cybersquatters argued that a domain name is
simply an address on the Internet, not a communicative message. Al-
though superficially appealing, this has always been a bogus argu-
ment. A domain name of the form "hup://www.paed.uscourts.gov" is
not. really an address-. the actual address for the Web site of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is
"littp://204.170.64.143." If that court's 'Web site is located on the par-
ticular server that hosts it, the court has no choice but to accept that
numeric address just as one has no choice in one's street or road ad-
dress if one wants to live in a certain house.
The domain name system, however, creates memorable alpha-
numeric names that are overlaid upon and correspond to the actual
Internet addresses. A better analogy to real world addresses involves
the modern trend of corporate entities identifying their buildings
with names such as "One Chase Plaza" or "Trident Center." These
"addresses" do not eliminate the numbered street addresses; they are
simply overlaid on top of the street addresses. And if "Trident Center"
were renamed "One Coca-Cola Place" without the permission of the
Coca-Cola Bottling Company, there would be a colorable trademark
problem. Courts have generally been unsympathetic to such cyber-
squatters, especially when the person offers the DN for a high price or
diverts the trademark holder's (potential) customers. To reach rea-
sonable results, however, courts often had to stretch and distort tradi-
tional trademark notions of unfair competition, initial interest confu-
sion, and dilution. 57
In 1999, WIPO produced a report at the behest of the Internet.
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers KANN) on how to
handle DN/TM disputes in the generic top level domains (gTLDs)
administered by ICANN. The report became the basis for the UDRP, a
67 See, e.g., Porsche Cars N. Am. v. Porschemet, 302 F.3d 248. 261 (4th Cir, 2002)
("ITThe enactment of ACPA eliminated any need to force trademark dilution law beyond
its traditional bounds in order to fill a past hole , ..."); Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's
Mkt.. Inc., 202 F.3d 489.497 (2d Cir. 2000) (The ACPA "was adopted specifically to provide
courts with a preferable alternative to stretching federal dilution law when dealing with
cybersquatting cases.").
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mandatory, but non-binding arbitration procedure for any party that
registers a domain name in the .com, .net, or .org environments."
Under the UDRP, a trademark holder can recover a DN in one of
these gTLDs on a showing:
• that the DN is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark, or
service mark in which the complainant has rights;
• that the DN registrant has no rights or legitimate interests in re-
spect of the domain name,
• that the DN has been registered and is being used in bad faith.59
The UDRP then provides an elaborate, but non-exhaustive list of evi-
dence for and against "bad faith" registration and use."
The UDRP has suffered from occasionally questionable, inconsis-
tent, and/or celebrity-solicitous decisions. 61 Nevertheless, the UDRP
remains a powerful example of lex Internet through a model law. Al-
though originally drafted, promoted, and promulgated to apply only
to three gTLDs (.com, .net, and .org), the UDRP's principles have
quickly been adopted for new generic TLDs. 62
 More importantly, the
UDRP has become the basis for dispute resolution standards in at
least twenty-five country's TLDs (ccTLDs). Countries such as Mexico,
Venezuela, and Guatemala have adopted both the actual UDRP
mechanisms and the arbitral institutions." In addition, countries such
58
 Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN (Sept. 29, 1999) [hereinafter
UDRP], available at littp://wwwicann.orgindrp/udrp-policy-29sept99.ium.
58 ld.1 4(a) (i)—(iii).
Id.1 4(h).
61 ANDRE R. BEIVIRAND, LE DROIT DES MARQUES, DES SIGNES Dts-nricrus ET DES
Norris DE DontioNE 578-83 (2002) (noting "the numerous contradictory decisions
rendered on identical facts" and the very broad definition of "trademark" used by WIPO
UDRP panels); Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme Dinwoodie, Designing Non National Systems:
The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 141,
255-56 (2002); see also Ian L. Stewart, Note, The Rest Laid Plans: How Umestrained Arbitration
Decisions Have Corrupted the Uniform Domain Name Resolution Polity, 53 Fun. Comm. L.J. 509,
518-22 (2001) (arguing that the arbitration process, being unrestrained, has damaged an
otherwise decent dispute resolution process, using cases involving celebrities' names as an
example).
62
 For example, paragraph 4(a) of the Start-Up Trademark Opposition Policy
("STOP") for the .biz gTLD repeats the UDRP three part test.
63 BERTRAND, supra note 61, at 579 (counting Romania, the Philippines. the Bahamas.
and Cyprus as countries that have adopted UDRP arbitration at WIPO for their country
TLDs).
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as Japan and Singapore have adopted the UDRP verbatim or almost
verbatim."
The United States has passed its own Anti-cybersquatting and
Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) that wanders from the precise
UDRP formula, but its nine factor test for bad faith hones close to the
UDRP's understanding of the conditions that should trigger a DN
transfer.65 Similarly, the dispute resolution policy of Nominet, the ad-
ministrator of Britain's ".tik" TLD, formulates its policy in terms of
"abusive registration" of a domain name, but the non-exhaustive list
of appropriate evidence on this question bears a strong resemblance
to the UDRP and ACPA.66 Even in France, which has not enacted any
specific laws to address cybersquatting and cybersquatting-decisions
under its trademark law have been the subject of some controversy,
UDRP decisions are recognized as a "pertinent jurisprudential
sources' for deciding cases. 67
The model effect can also strengthen the emerging international
legal norms by affecting law at the sub-nafional level. For example, ju-
diciary guidelines promulgated in August 2000 by the Beijing Higher
People's Court state that "bad faith registration and preemption of
other people's well-known trademarks are acts ... to which the Gen-
eral Principles of the Civil Law and which the Unfair Competition
Law Regulates. "68 The guidelines then integrate the UDRP standards.
Article V provides:
To determine whether or not an act of domain name regis-
tration constitutes domain name registration in bad faith,
" When a "Singaporean entity" adopted dispute resolution procedures to deal with
claims of cybersquatting in the ".sg" space, the Singaporeans adopted ICANN's UDRP
almost whole cloth but added a distinct mediation procedure. See Singapore Domain NallIC
Dispute Resolution Policy, Singapore Network Information Centre (SONIC) (Nov. 6, 2001),
available at http://www.nic.net.sg/pdf/SDRP.pdf. The Singaporean entity did, however,
add a mediation process; paragraph 4(e) provides that the parties will be invited to con-
sider whether they wish to have the dispute mediated by the Administrative Panel before
the Administrative Panel is called upon to decide the dispute, then sets out procedures for
such mediation. Id.1 4(e).
The ACPA has a non-exhaustive nine factor test that is very similar to the conditions
of UDRP Article 4(a) and (b) together. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d) (1) (B) (i) (2000), with
UDRP, supra note 58, II 4(a)—(b).
'A Dispute Resolution Service, Nominet.uk: The UK Internet Names Organization, II 3,
4, at http://www.nominet.orgmk/ref/drs-policy.httul (last visited Mar. 2003).
87 BERTRAND, supra note 61, at 571 ("[L]es decisions rendues sous l'egide du Centre
de mediation et d'arbitrage de I'OMPI apparaissent dans ce contexte comme une source
jurisprudentielie pretinente an regard du droit francais.")
68 Guidelines Set Forth for Healing Cybersquatting Cases, Beijing Higher People's Court
(Aug. 2000), available at Intp://wwwcpallkltd.com/Newsletter/DomainCase.html.
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the act shall be examined to determine whether or not it si-
multaneously meets the three necessary conditions as fol-
lows:
(1) That the registered domain name is identical with or
deceivingly similar to a representation owned by the right-
holder thereof;
(2) That the domain name holder does not enjoy any other
priority right in the representation of said domain name;
and
(3) That the domain name is registered and used in bad
faith. 69
Given the difficulty of translating western legal text into Chinese, this
is clearly an effort to hone close to the UDRP standards. Article V fur-
ther sets out examples of subsection 3 bad faith which mimic those of
the UDRP: offering the domain name for sale or other assignment to
the trademark holder, inducing Internet users to visit the person's
Web site for profit, creating deliberate confusion with the trademark,
preventing someone else from "registering the trademark and busi-
ness name as a domain name; or register[ingl the domain name for
the purpose of impairing another person's business good will." 70
These are all familiar types of bad faith conduct from the UDRP and
its jurisprudence.
Thus, the UDRP has helped prevent development of inconsistent
national standards for cybersquatting cases 71—something that was of
such concern in the late 1990s that the Clinton Administration ini-
tially opposed the ACPA on the grounds that it would be a greenlight
for other countries to write their own unique cybersquatting laws.
One could make a "tipping" argument that the dominance/im-
portance of ".com" means that as soon as dispute principles are adopt-
ed in that gTLD, everything would move in that direction. In sheer
number of inhabitants, the ".com" environment dwarfs the next three
TLDs combined (".de," ".net," and ".uk"). In ierestingly, the popularity
of the ".com" TLD extends far beyond obvious groups (like compa-
nies that operate internationally (airlines), that market internation-
69
 Id. art. V.
7° Id.
7 ' A possible example is Belgium's proposal of, but final decision against enacting, an
anti-cybersquatiing law. See ALEXANDRE CRUQUENAIRE, LE REGLEMENT EXTRAJUDIGAIRE
DES LMGES RELATIFS Aux Nosts ne DOMAINE 19-21 (2002).
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ally (liquor brands), or that need to appear Internet savvy).72 The al-
lure of ".com" arises, in part, from perceived commercial advantage;
as one domain name dispute arbitrator commented, "anyone with
knowledge of domain name economics knows that common, generic
terms under the . .com' TLD are the best domains to have because
they generate the most traffic."73
Such a "tipping" effect, however, would not conceptually distin-
guish this from other situations in which model codes or laws are
drafted at the international level and become carriers of new, domi-
nant. legal norms for the Internet. Given the amount of attention they
received, the UNCITRAL rules on electronic contracting had the po-
tential to do this, but they have not had influence on the scale of the
UDRP.74 If the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction is unable to resolve
its present impasse, jurisdictional rules for Internet-based transactions
and interactions might he another place to start viable, modest model
law proposals. One could imagine either (a) jurisdictional models on
limited areas of law and/or (b) jurisdictional models that allow coun-
tries to extend jurisdictional treatment reciprocally to Internet par-
ticipants from like-minded nations.
A comparison between the international success of the UDRP
and the domestic failure of UCITA as a model law might also lead us
to one conclusion: model codes for cyberspace will generally become
successful statements of legal norms when they address limited issues
72 For example, -.corn" is the home for in the UK, a local employment site
(hup://wwwworkfromhome.com ), local telephone directory information (http://ww
yell.com ), and the official beer of the Edinburgh Festival (http://www.caledonian80.com );
in the Netherlands, an Amsterdam restaurant (utp://www.cobracafe.com ); in China, a
construction company (littp://wwrwhaikaigroup.com ) and fashion operations (http://
wwwk-boxing.com); in Japan. a gay bar (hup://www3across2.com ); in South Korea, a city
guide for Seoul (http://www.nmetro.com ) and a restaurant (http://www.samwongarden.
com). Even in France, a country often irritated by all things American. ".com" has plenty
of adherents among companies who market mainly to locals. like "http://www.retro-
dor.com" (an old style bread maker), "http://ww.celio.com " (a Paris GAP-like chain),
"Imp://www.recrut.com " (a France employment agency), and "http://ww.cocomer.com "
(a restaurant), not to mention publicly supported arts entities like "http://www.lepalais-
ro)ale.com"and "http://wwwletheatreroyale.com ."
73 Ha'Aretz Daily Newspaper Ltd. v. United Websites, Ltd., (WIPO Arbitration and
Mediation Center, No. D2002-0272 (July 3, 2002) (Mueller, Arb., dissenting).
74 Space limitations do not permit me to compare, for example, the many ways UETA
and E-Sign in the United States did nat follow 'model" approaches advocated by UNCI-
TRAL's 1996 document. Compare UNCITRAL E-Commerce Model Law, sow note 56, with
Electronic Signatures in Global and Nat'l Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7006, 7021,
7031 (2000) and UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT (Proposed Official Draft,
1999), available at hup://www.law.upenn.edn/b11/tilc/fnact99/1990s/neta99.htm.
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where genuine agreement can be forged. The UDRP disavowed a
wide range of DN problems: conflicts with personal name holders,
conflicts about geographical terms or indications, and conflicts involv-
ing competing intellectual property interests. As drafted, the UDRP
focuses narrowly on situations where one person holds trademark
rights and another person holds the same or substantially similar DN
and no other rights attendant to that DN. In contrast, the UCITA pro-
ject sought. to create a model law for all occasions. Overly complex
and suffering from apparent bias, 75 UCITA's real problem as a har-
binger of new legal norms is that it reflects compromise, not agree-
men t.
C. Invisible Hand Convergence: Environment-Based
Emergence of Legal Norms
In the third kind of convergence, legal norms for the Internet
emerge without any intervention by international .bureaucrats. This
type of convergence occurs because of market (or environmental)
forces: either the economy adopts legal norms within a narrow spec-
trum of possibilities or the economy will not enjoy significant devel-
opment of the Internet on present models.
This type of legal convergence parallels a similar phenomenon
that has been observed in evolutionary biology: animals of different
genetic ancestries may "converge" in that they adopt the same struc-
tural design to solve the same environmental problem. As Janet
Moore and Pat Willmer have argued, "convergence is to be expected
when animals from different lines of descent have had to overcome
especially demanding problems in order to survive" in the same envi-
ronmental niche . 76 Legal systems respond separately to a changing
environment and may, like animals, make the same adaptations, so
75 In 2002, UCITA's backers continued to try to amend its provisions to make them
more palatable. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law ap-
proved a series of amendments to UCITA on August 2, 2002. See AMENDMENTS TO UNI-
FORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT (Proposed Official Draft 2002), avail-
able at lutp://www.law.upenn.edu/b11/tdc/ucita/UCITA_Amds_AMO2.1um; see also Ted
Bridis, Group Ohs Changes for Net Commerce (Aug. 6, 2002), available at http://wwKsiggraph.
org/ pub-policy/pdf/ ECommerce.pdf.
76 Janet Moore & Pat Willmer, Convergent Evolution in Invertebrates, 72 BIOLOGICAL.
REVS. CAMBRIDGE Pun.. Soc'v 1, 3 (1997). Whales provide an example of "convergent
design" because whales, despite being genetically closer to humans than fish, are designed
more like fish because they live in an aquatic environment. See also John 0. Hunter &
Jukka Jernvalla, Hypocone as a Kty Innovation in Mammalian Evolution, 92 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.
SCI. 10718 (1995) (describing convergent tooth designs in animals).
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that the "descendent" laws (animals) in different countries look more
like one another than like their respective ancestor laws (animals)."
When I propose that convergence can result from market or en-
vironmental forces, this is not to diminish the political importance
that coordinated, transnational lobbying has in affected areas. Private
actors often urge one nation to adopt another nation's law as its own,
but such lobbying will not produce consistent harmonization unless
environmental factors point toward one basic kind of solution. In this
sense, legal systems share "genetic material" in a way that distant, but
converging animal species would not. Two examples of this are, first,
limitations on ISP liability and, second, basic legal treatment of elec-
tronic signatures and documents.
1. Internet Service Provider Liability
One of the earliest legal issues facing the Internet was the liability
of ISPs for torts committed by non-related persons through the Inter-
net. Serious slander and libel got to the Internet long before serious
e-commerce. In addition to defamation, ISPs can confront liability for
third party data transfers that cause copyright infringement, trade-
mark infringement, disclosure of trade secrets, and violations of pri-
vacy rights.
Early on, it looked like ISPs would have broad exposure for third
party copyright infringement or defamation. In 1995, in Stratton Oak-
mont v. Prodigy, a New York court held an ISP strictly liable as the pub-
lisher of defamatory comments made by an unidentified party on one
of Prodigy's bulletin boards. 78 In the same spirit, the United States
Department of Commerce's early analysis of copyright and Internet
issues analogized ISPs to publishers, putting substantial liability on
them for third party infringements. 79 In 1999, in Godfrey v. Demon, the
Queen's Bench also concluded Mat a United Kingdom ISP could be
" Moore and \\Timer define "convergent evolution" as occurring 'when distantly re-
lated animals evolve separately, yet produce similarity: the descendants are therefore more
alike than were the ancestors." Moore & \Vintner, supra note 76, at 5; sec also SIMON
CONWAY MORRIS, TIM CRUCIBLE OF CREATION 202-03 (1998) (showing animals from (li-
vergent ancestries that converge in body design).
78 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *3 (N.Y Sup. Ct.
May 24, 1995).
79 See generally BRUCE. LEHMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND 11IE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUC -FURE: TIIE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP
IN INTELLECTUAL PROPER'FY RIGITIN (1995).
384	 Boston College Law Review	 (Vol. 44:359
liable under English defamation law if it had been advised of the al-
leged defamation."
Of course, alternative models were always available. Instead of
being likened to publishers, ISPs could be likened to telephone sys-
tems or even to the United States Postal Service. No one considers the
Postal Service or AT&T liable when one of them delivers to C a mes-
sage slandering B sent by A. In other words, looking to meatspace
does not give us an obvious analogy for the proper liability standard
for an ISP.
But market economics provides an obvious choice among the
competing standards of liability: With the present state of technology;
a country that imposes strict liability on ISPs for third party defama-
tion and copyright infringement is a country that might not have
widespread Internet service. The ISPs that do exist either will be
weighted down one by one by large defamation or infringement
judgments or will be driven out of business by the enormous policing
costs necessary to keep defamatory and infringing material off of
their system. The costs cannot be passed on without severely limiting
Internet access.
Barring improbable technology developments, 81 market forces
will force countries to move toward legal systems that either (a) com-
pletely shield ISPs from such liability or (b) enable ISPs to shield
theniselves from most liability through reasonable, affordable self-
policing. One sees this result over and over again; in fact, one com-
mentator recently noted that "the rules for ISPs [are] increasingly set-
tled. "82
In the United States, commentators and courts reacted swiftly to
the Stratton Oakmont decision." One example of the first choice of
8° Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd., 2001 Q.B. 201, 212, 218-20 (1999). The Godfrey
case was not a strict liability holding because Demon had been put on notice of the defa-
mation. See id. at 206.
81 Technological developments are improbable because all fixed works moving
through the Net are (a) eligible for copyright and (b) potential carriers of defamatory
material such that it would be very hard for au automated system to screen.
82 Michael Geist, Internet "Choke Points" Put the Squeeze on Content, GLogE & MAn, (To-
ronto), July 11, 2002, at B11.
123 See, e.g.. Religious Tech. Ctr. v Netcom On-Line Communication Sem, Inc„ 907 F.
Stipp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (stating that strict liability for ISPs "would chill the use
of the Internet because every access provider or user would be subject to liability when a
user posts an infringing work to a Usenet newsgroup"); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law
and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bul-
letin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS ENT. L.J. 345 (1995). See generally Sega Enters.,
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completely shielding ISPs from liability is section 230 of the Con-
sumer Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) . 84 Section 230 of the CDA provides
that "[n]° provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider." 85 As long as a provider of "an
interactive computer service" does not have responsibility "for the
creat.ibn or development of [the] information," the provider is
shielded from liability. 88 American courts have generously interpreted
this provision.°
As to the second approach, significant jurisdictions such as the
United States are now shielding ISPs from liability for third party con-
tent transfers when the following conditions apply:
• a non-control condition that the ISP does not control the content of
the third party information and does not control or actively par-
ticipate in who gets the third party information;
• a limited retention condition that the ISP does not retain the infor-
mation for any longer than is reasonable and necessary (which is
a short time with transmission services and might be permanent
with hosting services);
• a limited knowledge condition that the ISP does not know about. the
violative nature of the information and/or does not have reason
to know; and
• an expeditions "take-down" condition that the ISP remove or disable
information when it receives proper notice/allegation of a viola-
tion of law.
One can find the above-described formula in the United States' 1998
DMCA, a law giving ISPs a safe harbor from contributory and vicari-
ous liability for copyright infringement. 88 This formula is also mani-
fest in the European Union's 2000 Electronic Commerce Directive
Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry
Pubrg, Inc., 939 F. Supp, 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
84 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1) (2000).
85 Id.
86 Sec id.
87 Sec Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-35(4th Cir. 1997); Blumenthal v.
Drudge. 992 F. Supp. 44, 49-53 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that section 230(c) shielded AOL
from defamation liability by Matthew Drudge, even where Drudge was paid by AOL to
provide content to AOL users).
88 Sr! 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
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and its implementing national legislation, a law concerning liability
for third party defamation and intellectual property infringement. 89
Internet defamation cases in Japan have followed the same gen-
eral trend—which Japanese comight officials recommended in De-
cember 2000 as a template for copyright infringement actions. 96 At
about the same time, China pressed ahead and adopted ISP liability
rules along similar lines. On December 21, 2000, the Adjudication
Commission of the Supreme People's Court of China issued interpre-
tative guidelines on "several issues relating to adjudication of and ap-
plication of law to cases of copyright disputes on computer net-
works."91
 Article 5 of the interpretive guidelines creates the familiar
formula of creating liability where either the ISP knows of the in-
fringement or has received adequate notification thereof from the
copyright owner:
Article 5. Where any Internet service provider engaged in
provision of information contents has obtained knowledge
that an Internet user is, carrying out on the Internet, an act
of infringement on another person's copyright, or being
warned by the copyright owner based on solid evidence, fail-
ure to take measures for removal and elimination of the in-
fringing contents in order to eradicate the consequence of
the infringement, the people's court shall investigate it and
the network user, and impose joint liability thereon accord-
ing to the provision of Article 130 of the General Principles
of the Civil law."92
89 See Council Directive 2000/31/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, arts. 12-14 (on Certain Le-
gal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular, Electronic Commerce, in the
Internal market) [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive), available at hitp://europa.ett.int/
comm/internal-market/en/ecommerce/2k-142.1itm; see also Draft U.K. Electronic Com-
merce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, arts. 17-19, available at littp://www.citi.gov.uk/
industry_files/pdf/regulations.pdf,
9° Experts Working Group, First Sub-Committee, Copyright Council of Japan, Interim
Report (on Recourse and Punishment) (Dec. 2000) (reporting on 1997 and 1999 Tokyo District
Court cases regarding the issue of ISP liability).
9 ' Adjudication Commission of the Supreme People's Court of China, 1144th mtg.. In-
terpretation by the Supreme People's Court of Several Issues Relating to Adjudication of and Applica-
tion of Law to Cases of Copyright Disputes on Computer Naylor* (Dec. 21, 2000). available at
littp://www,cpahkltd.com/Archivesinterpretationby_the_Supreme_People.html.
92 Id. art. 5.
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The interpretative guidelines reflect the familiar ideas of shielding
the ISP from liability in the other direction."
In 2002, some content providers started casting about for new
ways to increase ISP liability or to find, to use Michael Geist's phrase,
other "choke points" in the infrastructure of the Internet where liabil-
ity could be applied against available "deep pockets." 94 I believe that
most of these "deep pocket" entities will be able to adopt the same
"structural" positions as the ISPs. Without these entities, the Internet
and e-commerce are not possible and we won't have them if too on-
erous burdens of policing or too great a financial risk from third party
liability is imposed.
Note, too, that sovereigns choosing reasonably to shield ISPs
from defamation and copyright infringement—risk and exposure
from private third parties—is quite different from sovereigns not
shielding ISPs from exposure to liability to the sovereign—typically in
areas where the state imposes censorship. Thus, the Chinese shield
ISPs from liability from private third parties, but pressure the same
access providers into "pacts" to filter content dangerous to the state.
In the same spirit, in October 2001, in faccuse v. General Communica-
tions, a Paris court declined to hold French ISPs responsible for a
hate-speech site hosted in the United States and accessible in France-
but the court noted that "it will not be possible to delay much longer
the debate on a more active participation by all Internet participants,
. including access providers."'"
"Article 8 provides that if an ISP takes down apparently infringing material at the re-
quest of a copyright owner, then a court will refuse any request from the "accused infringer
... [that] the Internet service provider[] be liable for breach of contract." Id. art. 8. Arti-
cle 8 also transfers liability for such "claims for compensations for damages" to "the person
giving the earn ing," i.e. the copyright holder. Id.
91 Geist, supra note 82, at 811 (reasoning that given that ISPs are shielded from liabil-
ity, the new targets are credit card companies and Internet search engines). For example,
in August 2002, a number of record companies Bled a complaint against Internet back-
bone providers seeking to force them to block a China-based Web site, "http://www . Lis-
ten4ever.cool," in Arista Records v. AT&T Broadband (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 16, 2002), available
of http://www.mindspring ,com/—macgill/L4Ever%20Complaint.pdf. The complaint
seemed premised on 17 USC § 502(j) creating a cause of action, a reading of the DIvICA
statute which baffled many of us.
J'Accuse v. Gen. Con lllll ications. et al., TO.I. Paris, Oct. 30, 2001, No. RG :
01/57676. note Gomez C[Q]it'il ne sera pas possible de differer longtemps encore le
debat stir tine participation plus dynamique de ['ensemble des acteurs d'internet en
ceux compris les fournisseurs d'acces.'), available at lutp://www.fornminternet.org/tele-
chargement/documentsitgi-par20011030.pdf. judge Gomez' remarks came despite a 1996
ruling from the French Constitutional Court holding an earlier law on ISP liability un-
consimtional on structural grounds, but with some emphasis on free expression concerns.
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2. Digital Signatures
It would be overly ambitious to claim that, as a whole, electronic
contract law is subject to parallel convergence. Contract law, particu-
larly concerning consumers, is a highly developed, highly localized
law subject to a great deal of "path dependency." But the Internet
creates pressure for convergence in at least two ways.
First, the Internet may attract attention to and create pressure
against unique and aberrant provisions of contract law. An example is
the recent repeal of German laws from the 1930s that made it "unfair
competition" for American mail-order operations to offer money-back
guarantees and generous, pro-consumer return policies.
Second, and more importantly, there are some baseline compo-
nents of contract law where parallel convergence can be expected.
These legal uncertainties must be solved or else the economy at issue
will not have widespread electronic contracting; the solutions most
likely not to be wrong are those that are minimal, general solutions to
the uncertainty. The most obvious of these are when contract law re-
quires a "document," a "writing," a "signature," and "delivery" of one
or more of those things. It was self-evident from the beginning that.
the digital, networked environment either failed to meet these re-
quirements96
 or could not be assumed to meet these requirements.
For prudent people entering sizeable contracts, the latter uncertainty
would be as lethal as being certain of legal shortcomings. One obvious
answer to this dilemma is the adoption of "equivalence" rules. 97 Ex-
amples of "equivalence" rules include the following: that under cer-
tain conditions, electronic files are legally sanctioned as functional
equivalents of paper documents; that under certain conditions,
authentication processes or elements are legally sanctioned as func-
tional equivalents of signatures; and that under certain conditions,
sending an electronic file and/or authentication is legally sanctioned
See Cons. const., July 23, 1996, D. 1996, 99, available at http://www.conseilconstitution-
nel.fr/decision/1996/96378dditm.
96 See. e.g., Andrew D. Murray, Entering into Contract.; Electmnically: The Real MEW., in
LAW AND 11EE INTERNET: A FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTRONIC CONIMERCE 17, 19-20 (Lilian
Edtvards & Charlotte Waelde eds., 2d ed. 2000) (concluding that a "digital document"
would have failed to meet document requirements under United Kingdom law in the late
1990s).
97 Id. at 20. As early as 1996, UNCITRAL advocated such a "functional equivalence"
approach. See UNCrIRAL E-Commerce Model Law, supra note 56, 15 (explaining the
"functional equivalent" approach).
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as the functional equivalent of "sending" or "delivering" paper docu-
men ts. 98
This can be achieved by statutory provisions on "legal effect" that
are increasingly common. Examples of such statutory provisions in-
clude the following: "Information shall not be denied legal effect or
enforceability solely by reason that it is in electronic form" (Prince
Edward Island, Canada) 99 IT] he requirement under any law for
affixation of signatures shall be deemed satisfied where electronic
signatures ... are applied" (Pakistan); 100 "A record or signature may
not be denied legal effect. or enforceability solely because it is in elec-
tronic form" (UETA, as codified in California); 101 and an obligation to
allow "contracts to be concluded by electronic means" that is achieved
by a prohibition on any "legal requirements applicable to the contrac-
tual process" would "result in such contracts being deprived of legal
effectiveness and validity on account of their having been made by
electronic means" (European Union). 102
Beyond such baseline equivalencies, an economy may implement
legal recognition of particularly secure methods of authentication,
producing a "layered" structure of record authentication law, as the
European Union did in its 1999 E-Signatures Directive. 103 The 1999
Directive established a legal framework for a system of "advanced elec-
tronic signatures which are based on a qualified certificate and which
are created in a secure-signature-creation device." 104 Such "advanced"
authentication schemes create problems in that they tend to specify
technology or require bureaucratic structures unnecessary to the
baseline "equivalency" provisions.
913 Set' UNCITRAL E-Commerce Model Law, supra note 56, 1 15.
° Electronic Commerce Act, R.S.P.E.L, ch. E 4.1, art. 4 (2001).
100 Electronic Transactions Ordinance Promulgated (Sept. 11, 2002), DAWN, available
nt littp://www.dawn.com/2002/09/12/top15,htm,
101 Cu.. Civ. CODE § 1633.7(a) (West Stipp. 2003). Section 1633.7(b) similarly provides
that la] contract may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because an elec-
tronic record was used in its formation." Id. § 1633.7(b).
102 E-Commerce Directive, supm note 89, at art. 9(1).
1°3 Council Directive 1999/93/EC, 1999 O.J. (L 13) 12-20 (explaining the European
Community's framework for electronic signatures), available at littp://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oydat/2000/1_013/1_01320000119en00120020.pdf.
104 Id. For a full exploration of the E-Signatures Directive and its implementation in
France, see generally THIERRY PIETIE-COUDOL, LA SIGNATURE el.ECTRON1QUE (2001).
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3. Smaller Issues Where Market Forces Cause Convergence
In addition to large topics like ISP liability and electronic signa-
tures, there may be small issues—or sub-issues of general legal areas—
where market economy or civil society forces will point toward con-
vergence. Let us consider two candidate examples.
a, The Single Publication Rule in Defamation Law
The single publication rule can have an important impact on the
measure of damages and on the time within which one can bring a
defamation action. Under the early common law of defamation, each
communication of a defamatory statement to a third party constituted
a separate "publication" giving rise to a new cause of action. 105 This
idea was easy to apply to an orator standing on the corner of Green
Park, but the idea loses much of its sensibility when applied to news-
papers and books, situations where one defamatory written statement
is given to many different people at different places over a single day
or over many years. The response to this problem was the "single pub-
lication" rule: as long as the defamatory statement remains un-
changed, wide distribution of a defamatory statement across geogra-
phy and time would be treated as one publication.m
With the Internet, defamation plaintiffs have argued, and will
continue to argue, that each downloading of a defamatory statement
constitutes a separate publication. One argument claims that the
"pull" nature of the Internet makes for a different result than with
"push" distribution by traditional publishers. 107 Courts are likely to
reject this kind of argument and coalesce around a kind of single
publication rule that as long as the defamatory Web site or Internet
posting remains unchanged, sequential hits, visits, and/or downloads
do not constitute separate publications. Judicial economy—its own
sub-category of "market forces"—offers one reason for such conver-
gence. Another reason is the equitable notion common to most socie-
ties: a party should not sleep on his or her rights.
LOS See, e.g., Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q.B. 185, 188-89 (1849).
I" Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, I N.E.2d 45, 46-49 (N.Y. 1948) (finding that a pub-
lisher's sale from stock of a copy of a book containing libelous statement was not a new
publication); Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc„ 4 N.YS.2d 640, 642-43 (App. Div.
1938), affd no op., 18 N.E.2d 676, 676 (N.Y 1939); RESTATEMENT (Secorrn) or TORTS
§577A[31 (1977).
07 Firth v. State, 75 N.E.2d 463, 465 (N.Y 2002) (arguing that "because publications
on the Internet are available only to those who seek them, each 'hit' or viewing of the re-
port should be considered a new publication that retriggers the statute of limitations.").
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b. Exceptions and Limitations to Copyright Law
Exceptions and limitations to copyright law are an area of na-
tional divergence and, at times, idiosyncrasy, but there are nonethe-
less common enough themes for one to think that economic and civil
society forces might push us toward greater convergence in this area.
Alain Strowel has noted five basic types of copyright exceptions that
are the most important in an "information society": private copying,
citation/quotation, ,news reporting, education and research, and li-
brary and archive exceptions.'" More importantly, he notes that these
exceptions essentially reduce to three "principal finalities": the private
sphere, circulation of information, and cultural and scientific devel-
opmen Li"
The basic notion in all of these examples is that the technologi-
cal/economic environment causes a kind of "converge or abandon
the environment" phenomenon—create electronic signatures or
abandon meaningful e-commerce. While I believe that this actually
occurs, the failure of grander visions of technological determinism
related to the Internet adds a note of caution. In a thoughtful analysis
and critique of early views of what the Internet would do to the legal
profession, Professor Richard Ross reminds us that such visions tend
to "overlook the power of social context to contain (as well as direct
or accelerate) effects supposedly immanent within technologies:go
D. Continued Diversity and Divergence in Legal Norms
In contrast. to the three categories above, in some areas of law,
divergence in the dominant norms in national legal systems will con-
tinue to affect the Internet. The most. visible of these areas of law is
the law of free expression, part of First. Amendment jurisprudence.
There is no better manifestation of abiding differences about
free expression than the dueling decisions in the LICRA v. Yahoo! dis-
pute. In 2001, in LICRA, a Paris court found that it had jurisdiction to
order YahoolUnited States (as well as YahoolFrance) to take techno-
logical measures to ensure that Internet users on French territory
could not receive visual images of Nazi paraphernalia over the Inter-
108 Strowel, supra note 54, at 198.
1°9 Id.; see also Shira Perlmutter. Future Directions in International Copyright. 16 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. U. 369, 370 (1998) (noting that despite variety in limitations and exceptions
in national copyright laws, "certain general categories are comnmn.").
11° Richard J. Ross. Conran+ nications Revolutions and Legal Culture: An Elusive Relationship,
27 Likw S.: Soc. INquntv 637, 639 (2002).
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net. The French court subjected the companies to hefty fines for any
failure to comply.'" Less than a year later, a district court in San Jose,
California granted Yahoo! summary judgment against any possible
enforcement of the Paris court's ruling, basing its decision on First
Amendment grounds." 2
The problem of expression that is protected in jurisdiction A
flowing into jurisdiction B, where it is prohibited, is not new For dec-
ades, Voice of America broadcasts were intended to do just that. In
the present networked world, there are perhaps three broad camps
on free expression issues. At one extreme is the United States, forced
to explain its particularly robust vision of free expression to other
democratic, civil societies that do not have the same constitutional
insistence." 3
 In the middle camp is a group of democratic countries
that forbid—and sometimes prosecute—"hate speech."'" At the other
extreme are countries like China, Saudi Arabia, and Zimbabwe that
forbid—and regularly move against—a wide range of Internet speech
that they deem dangerous or destabilizing.
Following the powerful language of the United States Supreme
Court in Reno v. ACLU, the United States seems fixed in its views of
free expression on the Internet." 5
 It is tempting to predict that the
United States will find itself more isolated on this count. But there is
also considerable instability in the other two groups. For example,
while Paris Judge Jean-Jacques Gomez shook the Internet world with
his jurisdictional and speech conclusions in LICRA, the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) has reversed recent French decisions enforcing
speech restrictions against a biographer of Petain and anti-Semitic
political activists. The ECJ's jurisprudence reflects not just European
111 UEJF et LICRA v. Yahoo!, Inc.,
	 Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, No. RG: 00/05308. avail-
able at h t tp:/ /www.cd Lorg/ /speech/ in tern ational/ 001120yahoofran ce.pdf.
112 ya hoo! Inc. V. La Ligue Contre Le Iticistne et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Stipp. 2d
1181, 1189-91 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
" 3
 Philip Reitinger, Legal Aspects of Government-Sponsored Prohibitions Against Rac-
ist Propaganda on the Internet: the US Perspective, Presented at the Seminar on the Role
of the Internet with regard to the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination in Geneva, Switzerland (Nov. 10-14, 1997), available at
http://www.un
 hchr.ch/html/men u2/10/c/racism/ reit inger.h un.
1 " See, e.g., Associated Press, Norwegian Convicted of Racism on the Internet in a Rare Case
(Apr. 24, 2002) (describing an April 24 Norwegian conviction for racist speech and a
March 7 judgment in Sweden against a tabloid that allowed racist comments on its Inter-
net chat site), available at http://www.lexis-nexis ,com/universe.
113
 See 521 U.S. 844 (1997); see also Am. Library Assoc, v. United States, 201 F. Stipp. 2d
401. 489-90 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (characterizing the Internet as a "public forum" for First
Amendment purposes and declaring unconstitutional Congressional tying of library fund-
ing to use of ineffective pornography filtering programs).
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conventions on human rights but the clear norm of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights that freedom of expression includes
freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through
any media and regardless of frontiers." 116
It should be remembered that non-convergence need not be lim-
ited to issues where there are heartfelt, deeply-embedded national
differences. Non-convergence may remain the state of affairs when
established national differences can be retained with only minor, tol-
erable losses in efficiency. To give a domestic example, imposing local
sales tax on Internet transactions will be possible when either (a) local
sales taxes are harmonized (seamlessness), or (b) database technology
permits vendors (or their intermediaries) to accurately and efficiently
impose differing tax rates. The point is that there has been, perhaps,
a tendency to overestimate the harmonizing effects of globalization
on meatspace practices,'" and we should avoid that same mistake
when pondering the fate of law on the Internet.
III. WHERE THE VERDICT Is STILL OUT
Many areas remain in which convergent legal norms related to
the Internet are possible, probable, and/or desirable. But there are
also areas of human activity where it may not be possible to forge
harmonized legal norms. In those areas, we may discover—to the
happy surprise of many—that the world can get. along just fine with-
out. a "seamless" legal infrastructure. Such areas of Internet-related
law include the following: extra-copyright protection of databases,
protection of the privacy of personal information, the "cultural excep-
tion" for audiovisual works in international trade, and patents on e-
commerce business processes. Each of these has been a bone of con-
tention, with no path to convergence immediately visible. Let me
briefly elaborate on two of the above-mentioned examples.
The problem of extra-copyright protection of databases arose
from early 1990s court decisions in the United States and Europe that
denuded large, comprehensive databases of copyright protection just
as the prospect of digital trade in such databases was becoming ap-
Ha Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19, G.A. Res. 217 A(III) U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., at 71, 74-75, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION or
HUMAN RIGHTS 1948-1988: HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED STATES AND AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL (Amnesty International USA 1988).
117 See, e.g., MAURO F. GUILLEN, THE LIMITS or CONVERGENCE (2001) (describing the
non-convergence of business practices in Spain, South Korea, and Argentina).
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parent." 8 In response, in March 1996, the European Union promul-
gated a directive establishing a strong intellectual property right
specific to databases (the Database Directive). In the months that fol-
lowed, awareness of and opposition to the Database Directive grew
among scientists, researchers, and educators in the United States. As a
result, by the time of the December 1996 WIPO Diplomatic Confer-
ence, database protection had to be taken off the negotiating table. In
short, an early attempt at "top-down" convergence failed.
Since 1998, Congress has considered various bills to establish
some kind of extra-copyright protection of databases in the United
States. via a misappropriation or unfair competition approach, al-
though no serious empirical demonstration of the need for additional
intellectual property in this area has come to light. Meanwhile, oppo-
sition among developing countries seems to have grown—politically
attached to a belief that TRIPS and the WIPO structures are already
biased in favor of wealthy nations. In this area, it seems that ultimately
there will either be "top-down" treaty convergence or no convergence
at all.
Access to raw data has, from a different. angle, also been a stick-
ing point in transatlantic relations in the form of protection of per-
sonal data. In 1995, the European Union promulgated a Data Privacy
Directive 119—a directive that threatens to disrupt data flows to third
countries that do not provide commensurate protection and safe-
guards for personally identified information. Canada, Australia, and
the United States have all found themselves embroiled, to one degree
or another, with the European Commission on this problem with no
apparent convergent norms in sight beyond some early and poten-
tially useful guidelines from the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD).
118 For an exhaustive account, see Justin Hughes, Political Economies of Harmoniza-
tion: Database Protection and Information Patents, Presented at the Institut Francais de
Relations Internationales ( June 10, 2002), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=
318486. The cases in question included Feist Publications, Inc. u Rural Telephone Service Co.,
Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), and Rudolf Jan Ronone/Van Dale Lexicograpfie B. V., HR 4 Jan. 1991
(translated in PROTECTING WORKS or FACT 93 (Egberti. Doznmering & P. Berra 1-lugen-
holtz eds., 1991)). Beginning in 1989, French courts also delivered a series of decisions
denying copyright protection to factual compilations on the grounds that they did not
reach "au rang de creation intellectuelle" or constitute au "apport creatif et intellectuel."
Sec LUCAS, supra note 1, at 40 n.79.
118 Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (focusing on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data), available nt http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/law_en.htm.
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CONCLUSION
Consider observations from two thinkers who are decidedly not
cyber-anything. Surveying the legal scene in 1995, Harold Berman
questioned the adequacy of "international law" and "transnational
law" as conceptual categories for law when the non-lawyers talk about
the economy, the environment, and society in terms of "world" and
"global.” 120 Professor Berman envisioned an understanding of global
law that would reintegrate "inter-state law" with "common features of
the various legal systems of the civilized world" and "the customary
law of transnational communities."121 A few years earlier, surveying
"high tech paranoia" literature, the Marxist writer Fredric Jameson
deemed it a genre in which advanced technology was used meta-
phorically to describe the world system. 122 In what. Jameson thought was
a fictional construct, "circuits and networks of some putatively global
computer hookup are narratively mobilized by labyrinthine conspira-
cies of autonomous but deadly interlocking and competing informa-
tion agencies."123
We have come to see that the global computer hookup is no
longer putative. The sources of information are unquestionably inter-
locking and competing, if not yet deadly; and the circuits have estab-
lished a transnational community that is slowly but inevitably mobiliz-
ing itself against features of various legal systems that are not common.
Understanding how this mobilization occurs—in both relatively
transparent ways and relatively low profile ways—is important for
scholars as well as activists.
Common legal norms are being forged which will sink much
deeper into national legal systems than did traditional norms of "in-
ternational" or "transnational" law that applied only between and
among sovereign states. Forging such norms is not. an easy task. As
one jurist noted concerning . harmonization of law applicable to the
Internet, "Wit each country, the temptation is the same to bring
one's own concepts and categories to the discussion." 124
 The concep-
tual give and take, the development of new categories and meta-
categories for law, will be about as interesting as law gets. On every
120 Harolt1J. Berman, World Law, 18 FoRmiAm	 L.J. 1617,1617-22 (1995).
121 Id. at 1622.




124 LUCAS, supra note 1, at 13-14.
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one of the topics mentioned in this Article, we are very far from the
last word,
